
2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Distr.: General
10 June 2015

Original: English

Main Committee I

Summary record of the 1st meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 1 May 2015, at 10 a.m.

Chair: Mr. Román-Morey (Peru)

Contents

Organization of work

General exchange of views

This record is subject to correction.

Corrections should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent as soon as possible to the Chief of the Documents Control Unit (srcorrections@un.org).

Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (<http://documents.un.org/>).

15-06905 (E)



Please recycle 



The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

Organization of work

1. **The Chair** drew attention to the draft programme of work and draft indicative timetable for Main Committee I and its subsidiary body, contained in documents (NPT/CONF.2015/MC.I/INF/1) and (NPT/CONF.2015/MC.I/INF/2), respectively. Main Committee I had the task of dealing with agenda items 16 (a) and (b) and 17 (NPT/CONF.2015/1), and the topic of disarmament education.

2. *The programme of work was adopted.*

General exchange of views

3. **Mr. Najafi** (Islamic Republic of Iran), speaking on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, noted that the Treaty was an essential basis for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and its full implementation would and should lead to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. The purpose of the Treaty was not just to prevent non-nuclear-weapon States from acquiring nuclear weapons, but also to disarm nuclear-weapon States. The indefinite extension of the Treaty did not imply the indefinite possession by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals and any such assumption was incompatible with the objective and purpose of the Treaty.

4. The Group underlined the importance of the advisory opinion issued in 1996 by the International Court of Justice that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law. The total elimination of nuclear weapons and the adoption of a universal legally binding agreement prohibiting their future production was the only absolute safeguard against their use or threat of use.

5. The Group remained deeply concerned by military and security doctrines, including that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which provided rationales for the use of nuclear weapons. The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons must therefore be excluded from all military doctrines and a treaty must be concluded on effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances to prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, and

particularly against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which would constitute a crime against humanity and a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

6. The continued lack of progress in the implementation of nuclear-weapon States' nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty and their undertakings spelled out in the outcome documents of the successive Review Conferences since 1995 undermined the object and purpose of the Treaty and the credibility of the non-proliferation regime. The Group therefore called for the full, effective and urgent implementation of the nuclear disarmament obligations set forth in article VI of the Treaty, the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", the 13 practical steps contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2000/28), and the action plan on nuclear disarmament adopted by the 2010 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol I)).

7. The Group welcomed the convening of the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament on 26 September 2013 and the adoption of General Assembly resolutions 68/32 and 69/58 on the follow-up to that meeting. The Group called for the full implementation of the two resolutions and reiterated its call for the Conference on Disarmament to establish, as the highest priority, a subsidiary body to negotiate and conclude a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons.

8. The Group strongly supported a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, and the elimination of existing stockpiles of those materials in an irreversible and verifiable manner. However, the inalienable right of States parties to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with relevant International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards must also be respected. Efforts by nuclear-weapon States to modernize their nuclear weapons, delivery systems and related infrastructure offset any reductions in the number of nuclear weapons deployed by those States or any steps they had taken to lower the operational readiness of those weapons.

9. The development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defence systems and the militarization of outer space could trigger a nuclear arms race. Substantive work must therefore begin in the Conference on

Disarmament on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 69/31. The Group believed that the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons further undermined disarmament commitments.

10. It was crucial to achieve universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, with a view to accelerating its entry into force. Although the Test-Ban Treaty would further nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, it was no substitute for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Pending its entry into force, States must immediately and unconditionally halt all nuclear weapons research, development and testing, including non-explosive tests and tests on new technologies with a view to upgrading their nuclear weapons systems. Moreover, all remaining non-States parties must immediately and unconditionally accede to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.

11. The Group had already submitted a number of working papers for consideration by the 2015 Review Conference, dealing with various issues, including security assurances (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.2), verification (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.3), nuclear-weapon-free zones (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.4), the inalienable right to develop research, production and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.5), safeguards (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.6) and nuclear testing (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.7), and a working paper which set forth recommendations for inclusion in the final document of the Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.24). Nonetheless, the Group reserved the right to present further recommendations during the work of the Committee.

12. **Mr. Lomónaco** (Mexico) said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was, in essence, a grand bargain between States parties, which had regrettably not been implemented because of certain States' failure to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty. Although the number of nuclear arsenals was substantially lower than had been during the cold war, it was unacceptable that more than 16,000 nuclear weapons, many of them maintained at high levels of operational readiness, continued to underpin certain countries' security doctrines. Compliance with article VI of the Treaty was neither conditional nor optional. The International Court of Justice had, in fact, issued an advisory opinion indicating that article VI implied an

obligation of States parties to the Treaty to conduct multilateral negotiations on effective measures for nuclear disarmament. Those negotiations had not yet taken place, and it was alarming that a number of States continued to insist that unilateral, bilateral or regional decisions were in line with article VI, or that that article could only be fulfilled under certain conditions.

13. It was also unacceptable that certain non-nuclear-weapon States continued to depend on nuclear weapons, or even deployed those weapons in their territories under the terms of military alliances. While nuclear weapons existed there was always the risk that, whether by accident or by design, they would be used. The indefinite extension of the Treaty did not imply that nuclear-weapon States enjoyed the right to retain their nuclear arsenals indefinitely. Attempts to claim otherwise undermined the credibility of the global non-proliferation regime and called into question the commitment of all States parties to implement articles I, II and VI of the Treaty and action 5 contained in the action plan on nuclear disarmament adopted by the 2010 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol I)).

14. The 2015 Review Conference must, at a minimum, reaffirm the unequivocal duty of nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, and the need for concrete action to initiate multilateral negotiations on effective measures for nuclear disarmament. To that end, Subsidiary Body I should hold substantive discussions on how those negotiations could be advanced and on the nature of the effective measures to be implemented. The Review Conference should also endorse the outcomes of the three international conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, held in 2013 and 2014, and the pledge made by the Austrian Government at the conference held in Vienna in 2014.

15. The elimination of nuclear weapons was a matter of fundamental importance for the entire global community, and not only for nuclear-weapon States or the States members of the Conference on Disarmament, a body which had been unable to move forward on its substantive agenda or resolve disagreements regarding its membership for almost two decades. States parties of the Non-Proliferation Treaty that were not members of the Conference on Disarmament should be asked how they viewed their exclusion from that body, and whether they believed that the General Assembly could serve as a more

appropriate forum for negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

16. Like many other countries, Mexico hoped that the current Review Conference would lead to the launching of a clearly defined and irrevocable process for the negotiation of effective measures to promote nuclear disarmament, in accordance with article VI of the Treaty. The current review cycle was the international community's last opportunity to ensure the inclusiveness of efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

17. **Mr. Wood** (United States of America) said that Main Committee I should seek to be ambitious and realistic in its objectives. The challenges of the Non-Proliferation Treaty were real, but the regime as a whole was too important to fail or to be held hostage to ideas that would not command consensus. The United States was committed to continuing efforts to advance nuclear disarmament and to increase confidence and transparency. The drastic reductions in its stocks of nuclear weapons had been possible largely as a result of unprecedented efforts by nuclear-weapon States, but also through the action of several States that had rid themselves of their nuclear weapons and acceded to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.

18. Since the 2010 Review Conference, the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty) had been brought into force. When the Treaty was fully implemented in 2018, it would reduce operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to their lowest levels since the 1950s. The United States had made clear its readiness to pursue further nuclear reductions with the Russian Federation, but progress would require a willing partner. The mission of the United States nuclear complex had been totally transformed since the cold war. Its investments were now geared to ensure the safety and security of the existing stockpile and the dismantlement of retired warheads. Modernization of its nuclear enterprise would eventually allow for still greater reductions in the number of weapons retained in reserve.

19. The United States had also reduced the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy; specifically, it would not develop new nuclear warheads, and life extension programmes for existing warheads would not support new military missions or

provide for new military capabilities. Furthermore, the United States had strengthened the negative security assurances that it provided to non-nuclear-weapon States that were parties to the Treaty and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. In addition to its significant nuclear warhead dismantling activities, the United States planned to seek funding to accelerate the dismantlement of retired nuclear warheads — of which there were approximately 2,500 — by 20 per cent in 2017.

20. Underpinning his Government's efforts was the recognition of the catastrophic consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons were both a security and a humanitarian issue. A practical step-by-step approach to disarmament was the only realistic route to a world without nuclear weapons. Such an approach meant pursuing all available avenues, with steps building on and creating opportunities for others.

21. As nuclear arsenals became smaller, verification become more complex, and a higher level of intrusiveness of verification was required in order to provide assurance to the international community. The United States, in partnership with more than 25 countries and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, had recently launched the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification with a view to developing a common understanding among States with or without nuclear weapons of monitoring and verification challenges throughout the nuclear weapons life cycle.

22. The United States was also working with the other nuclear-weapon States that were parties to the Treaty — China, France, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom — on the issue of disarmament; together, they had created a consensus-based Non-Proliferation Treaty reporting framework and a glossary of key nuclear terms in order to increase mutual understanding. Ongoing efforts by nuclear-weapon States on critical inspection techniques would enhance the verification regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The annual conferences of the five nuclear-weapon States contributed to building the foundation for future multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament by those States.

23. The United States had observed a moratorium on nuclear explosive testing since 1992 and would continue to pursue ratification of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. It also remained committed to launching

negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (fissile material cut-off treaty), a goal shared by all States under action 15 of the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)). Nations that continued to block those negotiations should consider the impact of their actions on global progress towards nuclear disarmament. He hoped that the group of governmental experts on the fissile material cut-off treaty with its recent adoption of a final report would break the current stalemate and allow negotiations to resume.

24. **Mr. Sano** (Japan) said that, on the seventieth anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan called on all nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States to take new joint actions towards implementing the disarmament pillar of the Treaty. He hoped that the final document of the Review Conference would reflect the recommendations for taking forward the consensus outcomes of the 2010 Review Conference contained in the working paper submitted by the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.16).

25. Along with verifiability and irreversibility, transparency was a prerequisite for successful disarmament negotiations. Increased transparency alleviated mistrust among States and was indispensable as a confidence-building measure and a basis for a stable security environment. All nuclear-weapon States should therefore provide baseline figures for their nuclear warheads against which disarmament measures could be reviewed. He urged nuclear-weapon States to use the standard Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative reporting form and to include numerical information in their reports.

26. It was essential for all nuclear-weapon States to further reduce the numbers of all their nuclear weapons, including non-strategic weapons, on a unilateral and bilateral basis, and eventually to engage in multilateral negotiations that included all nuclear-weapon States. In that regard, he commended China for leading the talks on the glossary of nuclear terms, and called on all nuclear-weapon States to submit a report on the upgraded glossary during the next review cycle.

27. His delegation hoped that the fissile material cut-off treaty draft proposed by France would generate momentum for the commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. If there was no progress on that treaty by 2020, negotiations outside the Conference should be considered. In the meantime, he urged the nuclear-weapon States to declare moratoriums on the production of fissile material.

28. As Co-Chair of the of the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and host of the upcoming meeting in Hiroshima of the Group of Eminent Persons established to advance that Treaty's entry into force, Japan urged the Annex 2 countries to sign and ratify the Test-Ban Treaty without waiting for the others to do so. The fact that the ban was being generally adhered to demonstrated that it was already a de facto international norm. As the only country to have ever suffered an atomic bombing, Japan hoped that awareness of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons would help to strengthen the Treaty regime.

29. Lastly, his delegation believed that disarmament and non-proliferation education was a valuable tool. With the average age of the atomic bomb survivors around 80, it was important to make younger generations aware of the tragedy that had been brought about by the use of nuclear weapons. The Review Conference's final document should call on the world's political leaders and youth to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki to witness the reality first hand.

30. **Ms. Martinic** (Argentina) said that the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty — disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy — reflected a careful balance of obligations between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. Unfortunately, little progress had been made in disarmament as compared to the other two pillars; the Conference should seek to remedy that discrepancy. The continued existence of nuclear weapons was a threat to humanity, making it necessary to achieve complete and verifiable disarmament. The elimination of nuclear weapons was the only way to guarantee against the potential use of such weapons, which would have irreparable humanitarian consequences.

31. She urged the remaining Annex 2 States to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty — which was necessary for that Treaty to enter into force. She

deplored the current impasse in the Conference on Disarmament and called on States to show the political will necessary for the resumption of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and an instrument on negative security assurances. Her delegation had participated actively in the work of the group of governmental experts on the fissile material cut-off treaty. While negotiations might be ready to begin, she was concerned at the unwillingness of some States to strengthen the disarmament regime by means of such a treaty. She hoped that such a Treaty would not merely universalize and legalize existing standards, but would help to advance compliance with article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

32. Regarding security assurances, States that had voluntarily decided not to hold nuclear weapons must receive the fullest assurances from nuclear-weapon States that they would be protected against the use or threat of use of such weapons. Complete security — the ultimate objective of the Non-Proliferation Treaty — would not be possible until an effective international agreement was concluded to that end. Such an agreement would, moreover, re-establish the balance between rights and obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

33. Argentina strongly supported nuclear-weapon-free zones as significant contributors to international peace and security. She urged those States that had made interpretative declarations in respect of the Additional Protocols to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) to withdraw them. Furthermore, nuclear-weapon States must respect all the nuclear-weapon-free zones in order for those zones to realize the full benefits of their status.

34. **Ms. Higgie** (New Zealand), speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, said that it continued to be deplorable that progress comparable to that made on prohibiting biological and chemical weapons had not been made on nuclear weapons. Continued failure to implement agreements reached at the previous Review Conferences could cast doubt on the value of any commitments made at the present Review Conference.

35. In particular, States parties should accelerate implementation of article VI of the Treaty by creating specific vehicles to give that article legal effect. To cite the troubled international security environment as a justification for retaining and upgrading nuclear

weapons was misguided and undermined the commitment of non-nuclear-weapon States to non-proliferation. As had emerged from the recent international conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, the risks to health, the environment and the food chain of an accident, system failure or human error involving nuclear weapons were greater than had been previously suspected.

36. She was pleased to introduce the New Agenda Coalition's working paper ([NPT/CONF.2015/WP.9](#)) analysing options for achieving and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons from a legal perspective, in which it concluded that States parties had a choice between two options: a stand-alone agreement, whether a comprehensive convention or a ban treaty, or a framework agreement that established a general system of governance for the subsequent negotiation of a series of mutually supportive secondary instruments or protocols. Any of the options outlined in that working paper would advance implementation of article VI, and all were fully compatible with the object and purpose of the Treaty.

37. **Mr. Quinn** (Australia) said that of the three pillars of the Treaty, disarmament had faced the most challenges. The building blocks for disarmament were increased transparency, entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, early commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons, and robust verification measures. Those building blocks would help to create an environment where nuclear-weapon States saw themselves as more secure without nuclear weapons than with them.

38. His delegation hoped that implementation of the New START Treaty would not be impeded by tensions created by the situation in Ukraine. Effective reporting in accordance with action 20 of the 2010 action plan was crucial to advancing the principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility. The recently adopted report of the group of governmental experts for the fissile material cut-off treaty should provide the basis for the early commencement of negotiations on that treaty. Australia welcomed the renewed global focus on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, and called on the Review Conference to forge an agreement on forward-looking measures to reinforce and refresh the 2010 outcome.

39. **Ms. Dominguez** (Cuba) said that 45 years after the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, nuclear-weapon States had yet to comply with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty. The so-called step-by-step approach was being used by some States parties to justify the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons and thus postpone achievement of the goal of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear-weapon States must provide legal and unconditional negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

40. The current Conference must not produce the same regrettable outcome as the 2010 Review Conference, which, for lack of consensus on disarmament proposals, had produced a Final Document that reflected only the personal views of the President. States parties should review both the positive and the negative aspects of implementation of the Treaty so as to propose effective, practical actions for the next five years. The fact that the large majority of the 22 disarmament-related actions contained in the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference had not been implemented undermined the credibility of the Treaty.

41. The current Review Conference should adopt an updated and strengthened action plan on nuclear disarmament with specific timelines for each action, in order to bolster the credibility of the Conference's work and to ensure that the commitments made should not remain pending indefinitely. The Main Committee should recommend a number of practical actions that would lead to the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty, including a commitment to initiate negotiations on, and conclude, an international instrument by which nuclear-weapon States would provide unconditional and legally binding assurances that they would never use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

42. Nuclear-weapon States should commit to renounce definitively the concept of nuclear deterrence and any role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines and in security policies; the maintenance of programmes for modernizing existing nuclear weapons and developing new types of nuclear weapons; and the deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States. Lastly, the Conference should recommend initiating in 2015 multilateral negotiations on an international nuclear disarmament convention that would prohibit and eliminate all

nuclear weapons within 20 years in a safe, transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner.

43. **Mr. Bylica** (European Union) said that all States parties were obligated to pursue policies that were fully compatible with the Treaty, and stressed the need for concrete progress on disarmament as provided for in article VI. The European Union welcomed reductions in nuclear arsenals made thus far and progress on implementation of the New START Treaty. It commended the proposal of further reductions made by the United States in June 2013 and urged the States with the largest arsenals to seek further reductions, including to their strategic, non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed weapons.

44. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, through which an entire class of weapons had been eliminated, was an important element of the post-cold war European security architecture. He called on all nuclear-weapon States to show the same transparency as the two nuclear-weapon States members of the European Union, and reiterated the call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion in the Conference on Disarmament of a fissile material cut-off treaty. The European Union called on States that had not yet done so to declare an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. In that regard, it welcomed the successful conclusion of recent discussions by the group of governmental experts for the fissile material cut-off treaty, which would lay the groundwork for future negotiations.

45. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty remained a top priority for the European Union, which had provided more than 15.5 million euros in support of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. All the States members of the European Union had ratified that Treaty, and he welcomed the 12 new ratifications that had occurred since the previous Review Conference, including that of Indonesia, which was an Annex 2 country. He called on all States, including the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to abide by a moratorium on nuclear tests pending the Test-Ban Treaty's entry into force.

46. The European Union noted the ongoing discussions on the consequences of nuclear weapons, including those that had taken place at the Vienna

Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons. It called on all nuclear-weapon States to reaffirm the existing security assurances noted by United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and recalled in Security Council resolution 1887 (2009). It welcomed the signature by the nuclear-weapon States of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, recalling that the Russian Federation had specifically made a commitment under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine. The European Union reaffirmed its commitment to respect for international law in international relations, including in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.

47. **Mr. Bugajski** (Poland) said that while his delegation welcomed the ongoing implementation of the New START Treaty, it was concerned at the violation by the Russian Federation of its commitment under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine. It called on the Russian Federation to comply with its obligations under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. All categories of nuclear weapons, including non-strategic nuclear weapons, should be included in future talks between the Russian Federation and the United States, and his delegation hoped to see specific reference to that issue in the Review Conference's final document.

48. Greater transparency in reports submitted by nuclear-weapon States would build trust and create common ground. His country had submitted its report to the Review Conference and encouraged other States to make use of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative reporting template. It applauded the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, which would serve as a complementary tool to the ongoing processes of the Treaty regime.

49. **Ms. Stromšíková** (Czech Republic) said that her delegation welcomed the disarmament efforts made thus far by nuclear-weapon States, but there were many additional steps that needed to be taken in order to achieve irreversible nuclear disarmament. While calls by some States to adopt the proposed Model Nuclear Weapons Convention were commendable, effective disarmament would require constructive and open-minded dialogue with nuclear-weapon States.

Disarmament could only be achieved if the non-proliferation regime was strengthened first.

50. Her delegation placed great emphasis on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in the Middle East, and regretted the delay in holding the Helsinki conference planned for 2012. The establishment of such a zone must be part of a comprehensive solution that included the elimination of all categories of weapons of mass destruction and a peace settlement in the Middle East region. It was important for nuclear-weapon States to respect their commitments with regard to security assurances in order to build trust between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. The blatant violation of the Budapest Memorandum by the Russian Federation cast serious doubt on the integrity of the non-proliferation architecture in general and the Treaty in particular. States parties that chose to withdraw from the Treaty should remain responsible for any violations committed prior to the withdrawal.

51. **Mr. Ulyanov** (Russian Federation) said that the commitment made by the Russian Federation to the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including nuclear disarmament, was supported by the results it had achieved, notably with regard to reductions in its nuclear arsenal. In all, the Russian Federation had reduced its strategic offensive arms to one fifth of its holdings at the peak of the cold war, and its tactical nuclear weapon arsenal to one quarter. It had also significantly reduced its number of deployed nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles. It was therefore puzzling to hear claims that nuclear disarmament was lagging; such statements must be explained either by lack of information or wilful intent to replace objective assessments with emotion. Nuclear arsenal reductions under the New START Treaty were ongoing. By February 2018, the Russian Federation and the United States would reduce their respective numbers of delivery vehicles and warheads to the stipulated levels.

52. States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had repeatedly confirmed that disarmament should be carried out under conditions of strategic stability and equal security for all. However, it was difficult to make progress in the current climate of international instability and insecurity, owing in part to the unilateral implementation of the global anti-ballistic missile system, aimed at securing a military advantage at the expense of other States. The Prompt Global Strike programme and the failure to develop

arrangements to prevent the deployment of weapons in outer space had an extremely negative impact; in that connection, he supported the statement made by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties.

53. The fact that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty had not yet come into force also affected modern international relations. Conventional weapons in Europe also did not facilitate progress in nuclear disarmament. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe had been concluded 25 years earlier and plans to negotiate a new agreement that might correspond better to current realities remained a mere intention.

54. With the conclusion of the New START Treaty in 2010, the Russian Federation had virtually exhausted the possibilities of reducing its nuclear arsenal bilaterally with the United States. Further steps to that end could only be made with the involvement of all States possessing military nuclear capabilities. While supporting the ultimate goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons, his delegation remained unclear as to the best way to achieve it. Aside from developing a nuclear weapons convention, it was also possible, in accordance with the preamble and article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to achieve the total elimination of nuclear arsenals by negotiating a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Although seemingly forgotten over the past few decades, complete disarmament remained a valid international obligation for all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

55. He respected the concern of States regarding the danger of nuclear war and their efforts to ensure rapid progress in nuclear disarmament. The Russian Federation had transferred all tactical nuclear weapons remaining in its territory to the non-deployed category, thus de-alerting such weapons on an unprecedented scale. Those weapons were located primarily at centralized storage bases with a high-level security regime that prevented theft and any unauthorized use. The Russian Federation neither deployed nuclear weapons outside its territory nor transferred control of its nuclear weapons to other States, directly or indirectly. In contrast, the nuclear-sharing arrangements of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were a clear violation of articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

56. He called on States members of NATO to immediately terminate such nuclear-sharing arrangements and thus comply with their obligations under the Treaty. The fact that such arrangements had existed for over 40 years was not a reason for them to continue; the only appropriate action was to immediately return all nuclear materials to the territories of nuclear-weapon States and to destroy all infrastructure in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States that allowed for the rapid deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons and the completion of preparations for their use with the involvement of non-nuclear States.

57. The Russian Federation had heard the appeals by non-nuclear-weapon States for a diminished role of nuclear weapons in the military doctrines of nuclear-weapon States. According to his Government's military doctrine, the use of nuclear weapons was a purely defensive provision and could be considered in just two exceptional cases: the use of weapons of mass destruction against the Russian Federation or its allies, and situations in which the very existence of the State was under threat. The new concept of "non-nuclear deterrence" had appeared in the latest edition of the military doctrine, in which the role of nuclear weapons for reduced even further. Some 25 years previously, the Russian Federation had also unilaterally imposed a voluntary moratorium on the production of fissile material used for creating nuclear weapons, which remained in force. The statements made by the European Union and by representatives of its member States offered a certain interpretation of the Budapest Memorandum that only served to undermine the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

58. **Mr. Biontino** (Germany) said that the 2010 action plan remained a valid road map for the future. Germany welcomed the ongoing implementation of the New START Treaty and the unilateral disarmament steps taken by some nuclear-weapon States and called upon the United States and the Russian Federation to continue their bilateral efforts to constructively engage with each other in order to achieve further reductions. The offer by the United States to start a new disarmament round with Russia prior to the complete implementation of the New START Treaty in 2018 was still on the table and was an opportunity that must not be missed if progress was to be made towards the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, to which Germany

remained strongly committed. Russia should therefore respond constructively to that initiative.

59. In the Treaty community, many were wondering whether the step-by-step-approach was still valid. Some asked whether it might not be more appropriate to immediately start negotiations on a nuclear weapon ban or convention, a view that Germany did not share. Effective and verifiable nuclear disarmament did not take place in a vacuum, but in a concrete security and political context. For the time being, nuclear weapons were still assigned a role, however limited, in military doctrines, including that of NATO, of which Germany was a member.

60. All the measures contained in the 2010 action plan presupposed trust between partners and a cooperative setting based on reciprocity. Following the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia and in light of the Ukraine crisis, considerable trust had been lost, including with regard to so-called negative security assurances. Also of concern were the repeated statements by Russian officials implying a possible use of nuclear weapons, which did not help to rebuild that trust. In the current difficult climate, it was of paramount importance to honour the disarmament and non-proliferation commitments made under existing treaties, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which was a crucial element of Euro-Atlantic security.

61. Against that sobering backdrop, the Conference should help to rebuild trust in the implementation of the 2010 action plan, with its detailed proposals for all three pillars, including addressing the concerns about the catastrophic humanitarian impact of the detonation of nuclear weapons.

62. Germany interpreted article VI of the Treaty as a duty to engage with a view to achieving concrete and verifiable results and therefore much more than just an appeal. Furthermore, the obligations of all States parties under article VI were at least partially spelled out in consensus documents agreed at previous Review Conferences. Some of those obligations required further negotiation and consequently could not be fulfilled unilaterally. Others, such as the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, could be brought about without the corresponding engagement of other States.

63. It was highly regrettable that the Test-Ban Treaty had not yet entered into force and negotiations on a

treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices had not yet begun. The group of governmental experts on the negotiation of such a treaty had laid the groundwork for the negotiations, which should begin as soon as possible.

64. Some delegations had criticized the NATO nuclear-sharing policy, but the relevant arrangements pre-dated the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and were consequently grandfathered into the Treaty. NATO had also reduced its sub-strategic arsenals by up to 20 per cent after the end of the cold war and had reiterated its firm resolve to create a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the Treaty. For NATO, the circumstances under which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated were extremely remote, but as long as nuclear weapons existed, it would base its deterrence policy on an appropriate mix of capabilities, including nuclear capabilities.

65. **Mr. Simon-Michel** (France) said that France shared the goal of a world without nuclear weapons when the strategic context would allow for it. However, disarmament could not be decreed; it could only be achieved through a series of concrete measures, step by step. While some were impatient with the pace and scope of nuclear disarmament, there had nevertheless been significant progress over the past 20 years: nuclear arsenals had been reduced by over 75 per cent and nuclear testing by all five nuclear-weapon States parties had ceased. The Treaty's approach was pragmatic, as it took fully into account the strategic context in which nuclear disarmament would take place. Approaches that did not do so would not achieve progress in that area. The 2010 action plan was an ambitious and long-term road map that should be followed without deviations, step by step.

66. Fully aware of its commitments under article VI, France had adopted irreversible and therefore exemplary measures for disarmament, including by definitively and irreversibly dismantling its test sites and its fissile materials production facilities, fully dismantling the surface-to-surface component of its deterrence capability and dismantling one third of its submarine and aerial components. Those decisions required ongoing efforts and substantial resources, and showed its commitment, on a daily basis and over the long term, to nuclear disarmament.

67. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was a priority, and there was no good argument for putting it off further. The Treaty's verification system had been fully tried and tested, and waiting for further ratifications was no excuse for lack of progress. The start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, which should be universal and verifiable and not a voluntary moratorium, was a priority. The Test-Ban Treaty had set a qualitative limit to the development of nuclear weapons; a fissile material cut-off treaty should now set a quantitative limit in that regard.

68. France welcomed the discussions by the group of governmental experts on such a treaty and the adoption of its report by consensus. The discussions had gone further than ever before, and although the differences in positions had seemed to all to be surmountable, the Conference on Disarmament had held the most constructive discussions ever on a fissile material cut-off treaty in June 2014. France would like to build on the success of the group of governmental experts and had therefore submitted a draft fissile material cut-off treaty to the Conference on Disarmament that was ambitious, realistic and verifiable, and that proposed irreversible measures. The next logical step towards multilateral disarmament would be the start of the related negotiations in the Conference.

69. **Mr. Pollard** (United Kingdom) said that the United Kingdom had made a significant contribution to the overall reductions in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons and had steadily reduced the size of its nuclear forces, which, since 1998, had been composed of a single platform, a single delivery system and a single warhead design. In January 2015, it had announced that the number of warheads on each of its deployed ballistic missile submarines had been reduced from 48 to 40, and the number of operational missiles on each of those submarines to no more than eight. The total number of operationally available warheads was no more than 120, which would enable the country to reduce its overall nuclear warhead stockpile to no more than 180 by the mid-2020s.

70. The United Kingdom also had been reducing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in its defence and security policy. It viewed its nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent; they were political not military weapons. Nuclear weapons would be employed only in extreme circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of NATO allies, and none of the country's

weapons would be used contrary to international law. The nuclear weapons were not on high alert, nor were they on a "launch on warning" status. The patrol submarine operated routinely on a "notice to fire" basis measured in days, rather than in minutes, which was the case during the cold war. Since May 1994, the patrol submarines' missiles had been de-targeted.

71. In support of transparency on all issues relating to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the United Kingdom had issued, in 2014, a report in response to the call in action 5 of the 2010 action plan and sought feedback from civil society and non-nuclear-weapon States. In the light of that feedback, it had released a revised version of the report in February 2015, which had been submitted to the current Review Conference. His Government had provided a revised assurance during the current review cycle that it would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties, and had called for universal adherence to the Treaty. That assurance would, however, not apply to any State that was in material breach of its non-proliferation obligations.

72. By ratifying protocols to the existing treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones, the United Kingdom had given assurances to approximately 100 countries and was pleased to have signed and ratified the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia in the past 12 months. Further progress on nuclear-weapon-free zones would provide the credible, regional, internationally binding legal instruments on negative security assurances sought by many. The United Kingdom would continue to engage with States parties to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in order to facilitate signature of the relevant protocol to that treaty in the near future.

73. The United Kingdom had been among the first States to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and had maintained a voluntary moratorium on nuclear test explosions since 1991. It now provided extensive technical, financial and expert support to the three pillars of the verification system established by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and opposed calls from some States to cut funding to the Organization's technical organs.

74. His Government actively engaged in work streams by the European Union and the permanent five

members of the Security Council aimed at improving the International Monitoring System and regularly sponsored projects in support of the Organization. A recent example was a successful workshop providing training on the use of new open-source tools and technologies for verification purposes. The United Kingdom had provided a significant amount of equipment and technical expertise to the Organization's Integrated Field Exercise 2014, which demonstrated a change in the Organization's on-site inspection capability.

75. The United Kingdom had announced in 1995 that it had ceased the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. All facilities used for the production of such material had been or were being decommissioned, or used only for peaceful purposes. All enrichment and reprocessing in the United Kingdom since 1995 had been conducted under European Atomic Energy Community safeguards and the terms of the safeguards agreement between the United Kingdom, the Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and all civil nuclear material in the country was subject to those arrangements. In 1998, the United Kingdom had placed all nuclear material excess to its defence requirements under international safeguards.

76. The start and early conclusion of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material was an essential step on the road to complete global nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament should adopt a balanced and comprehensive programme of work and subsequently negotiate such a treaty. The United Kingdom was pleased that the group of governmental experts established on that issue had been able to produce a substantive report.

77. Verification was likely to play an increasing and crucial role in disarmament measures. The United Kingdom was a world leader on research in the development of verification capabilities for warhead dismantlement, on which the United Kingdom/Norway Initiative, the first and only such established project between a nuclear-weapon State and a non-nuclear-weapon State, continued to make progress. The United Kingdom also had a long-running bilateral verification research programme with the United States, which focused on different aspects of verification than the United Kingdom/Norway Initiative. The United Kingdom would continue its work on disarmament verification during the next review cycle, including within the

International Partnership on Nuclear Disarmament Verification recently established by the United States.

78. The United Kingdom had also established a process for the five nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to discuss disarmament issues. That process served to build trust and confidence among those five States and with the rest of the world. During the current review cycle, that process had enabled the five States to report on progress in fulfilling their disarmament commitments in a common format for the first time. The United Kingdom was committed to maintaining that level of transparency and anticipated reporting to States parties during the next review cycle, in line with action 21 of the 2010 action plan. It would retain a credible and effective minimum nuclear deterrent for as long as the global security situation made it necessary, but remained committed to its obligations under article VI of the Treaty.

79. **Mr. Barros Melet** (Chile), speaking on behalf of the De-alerting Group, said that the Group was deeply concerned that the number of warheads on high alert multiplied the risks posed by nuclear weapons, increased the probability of an inadvertent, erroneous, unauthorized or precipitous launch, and represented an unacceptable danger to humanity, as even a small percentage of those warheads, if used, could kill millions of people. The initiative highlighting the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons had shown the urgent need to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which was the only guarantee against their future use. Pending that achievement, nuclear-weapon States must take urgent action to minimize the risk of a nuclear-weapon detonation, including by reducing alert levels.

80. Lowering alert levels was an integral element of the nuclear disarmament process, and was an area in which the implementation of practical measures should be possible. Progress was increasingly expected in that regard, as reflected in General Assembly resolution 69/42 on lowering operational readiness, and in the number of States and groups that had taken up the issue during the Treaty review cycle, including the New Agenda Coalition and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative.

81. While the reports submitted by nuclear-weapon States under the 2010 action plan addressed de-alerting, there was no evidence in those documents

or in the wider public domain that meaningful progress had been achieved since 2010, as high alert levels continued to play a central role in the doctrines of certain countries. In keeping with action 5 of the 2010 action plan, the De-alerting Group had submitted a working paper ([NPT/CONF.2015/WP.21](#)) in which it highlighted a number of points that were central to understanding the urgent need for action on operational readiness. He invited all delegations to study closely the proposals made in the working paper, and hoped for broad support for the issue and for an in-depth discussion on the specific recommendations put forward.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.